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THE PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANISATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW
Geoffrey Marston*

I. INTRODUCTION.
In his judgment in Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3) in the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the highest judicial tribunal
in the United Kingdom, Lord Templeman stated:
The Tn Council case reaffirmed that the English courts can only
identify and allow actions by individuals, sovereign states and corporate
bodies. The Yin Council case reaffirmed that the English courts cannot
identify and allow actions by international organisations which sover
eign states by treaty agree to bring into existence.!
The Tin Council case 2 was the first of three decisions in the English
courts within the last ten years which have directed attention upon the
legal status of international organisations in English law with an intensity
not previously seen. For many years previous to these decisions a large
number of international organisations had operated without obvious
difficulty within the British legal system.3 The purpose of this article is
to trace in outline the history of this relationship, to see how it was put
under strain by the three cases, and to consider whether there are any
other areas of doubt which might one day lead to further litigation.
II. THE PERIOD UP TO 1940.
During the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom became a
member of a number of organisations established by inter-State or inter-

* Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England.

1. [1991] 2 A.C. 114, 165, 2 W.L.R. 729, 737 (H.L.).
2. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade and Industry, [1990] 2 A.C. 418 (H.L.).
3. This article is confined, out of caution, to the English legal system although it is not
assumed that the Scottish legal system has a different approach in the matters treated below.
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Government agreements.
These organisations, which included the Rhine and Danube river
commissions and public utility bodies like the International Telegraphic
Union and the Universal Postal Union, had their administrative headquarters outside the United Kingdom and the question whether they were
entitled to legal personality in English law does not seem to have arisen
for determination. United Kingdom legislation was not usually needed to
give effect to their status or activities. Even on the rare occasions when
legislation was required - e.g. the Sugar Act of 1903' to implement the
determinations of the Sugar Commission under the Sugar Convention of
1902 - no provision was made to define the organisation's legal status
within the United Kingdom.
The creation of the League of Nations by the Covenant forming an
integral part of the Treaty of Peace in 1919 first caused legal thinking to
turn to the domestic nature of the international body thus created. The
Covenant did not expressly provide for the legal personality of the
League, either in international law or in the laws of its member States.
It did provide in its Article 7(3), however, that the representatives of the
League's members and its officials when engaged in the business of the
League were to enjoy "diplomatic privileges and immunities" and that
the buildings and other property occupied by the League, its officials and
by representatives attending its meetings were to be "inviolable".6 As the
League's headquarters were established in London for the first year of its
life some problems about its legal status might quickly have arisen but
in fact none apparently did, although the League must have purported to
enter into local contracts for such matters as premises, labour, goods and
services. It was as late as 1938 when a question arose over the customs
treatment of goods imported into the United Kingdom by the International Labour Organisation (0LO) in the name of the League. In an internal
minute dated December 19, 1938, one of the legal staff of the Foreign
Office, W.E. Beckett, wrote:
We might point out ... that the Customs have some doubt as to
whether the League of Nations as an entity and its property should be
treated in the same way as the property of a foreign Government, and

4. For a brief account of nineteenth century international organisations, see DEREK W.
BowvEr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 6-9 (4th ed. 1982).
5. Sugar Convention Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7, ch. 21 (U.K.).
6. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, Jan. 10, 1920, art. 7, para. 4, 5, in ESSENTIAL FACTS
ABOUT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 15 (Information Section of the League of Nations Secretariat, 9th
ed. 1938).
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on this we should say that the League of Nations is an entity of which
all the members are governments and financed entirely by governments,
to treat all matters of State such as those that are treated between
governments through diplomatic channels, and that we feel no doubt
that this property must be treated in the same manner as the property
of the governments who compose it.7
This advice was reflected in the Foreign Office's official response
to the Board of Customs on January 12, 1939.8 It was still not clear,
however, whether the League and the ILO were to be regarded as distinct
legal personalities in English law.
The English courts had their first contact with international
organisations when one Commander Godman asserted that he was owed
money by the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, established
not by formal treaty but by a meeting of States at Evian, France, in
1938.' Within the Foreign Office, Beckett wrote that the Committee was
not a "corporate body" and so could not be sued as such; as for the
possibility of suing the member governments, they would be immune,
with the exception of the United Kingdom; as for the possibility of suing
the individual persons constituting the Committee, they would be
protected either by general diplomatic immunity if they were also foreign
diplomats en poste in London or by "governmental immunity" if they
were not.'0 In the event, Godman sued four individual members of a
sub-committee of the Committee. His statement of claim, however, was
struck out by the Court of Appeal on the ground that the action was "one
against sovereign States through their agent, the Inter-Governmental
Committee". It followed from the doctrine of absolute Sovereign
immunity then prevailing in the English courts that the action could not
be maintained.
III.

THE PERIOD FROM 1940 TO 1944.

So far, British executive and judicial practice was ambiguous on

whether in English law an international organisation, established by treaty
or otherwise, was more than a collectivity of its member States, and
7. See Geoffrey Marston, The Origin of the Personalityof International Organisationsin
UnitedKingdom Law, 40 INTL & COmp L.Q. 403, 406 (1991) (quoting letter from W.E. Beckett,
Second Legal Advisor, Foreign Office, to the Foreign Office (Dec. 19, 1938)).
8. Id. at 406-07.
9. Godman v. Winterton, Ann. Dig. 205, 206 (Eng. C.A.) (Supp. 1919-1942) (Godman).
10. Marston, supra note 7, at 407.
11. Godman, supra note 9, Ann. Dig. at 207.

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 2:75

therefore possessed a separate legal personality of its own. The perceived
need, as part of the war effort, to establish by treaty various international
organisations operating within Allied States caused a more detailed
scrutiny to be given to their national legal status. The first such body,
proposed in a draft agreement of August 1942, was a United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Organisation (UNRRA) with power to acquire,
hold and convey property and to enter into contracts and undertake
obligations.12 Discussions began between officials in the United States
and the United Kingdom as to how such an organisation could operate
under the national laws of each country. The informal opinion of the
United States officials was that:
... UNRRA will derive from the international agreement creating it the
legal capacity to discharge the functions entrusted to it by the agreement and should be accorded in each country a capacity and status in
respect of suit, the conclusion and discharge of obligations, the holding
of property, etc. like unto that of individual foreign states. We are of
opinion that under common law principles UNRRA will enjoy such
capacity independently of any legislation defining its position since the
effect of the international agreement is not to modify existing rules of
law but to create as the agent of the signatory nations as a group a new
legal person which would be entitled as such to exercise rights under
the existing law. 3

On receipt of the above views, the United Kingdom Attorney-General,
Sir Donald Somervell, having consulted amongst others the Legal
Advisor to the Foreign Office, Sir William Malkin, observed on October
14, 1943:
Apart from natural persons and corporations created by Royal Charter
or under Act of Parliament, groups have only been recognised as legal
personae under some specific statutory provisions. To recognise a group
of Nations as a legal persona would be novel. The Common Law is
however said to14 be an elastic system which should be able to move
with the times.

The Attorney-General was disinclined to advocate legislation unless it
was necessary.

12. See Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1944,7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 44 (U.K.); Diplomatic

Privileges (U.N.R.R.A.) Order, S.I. 1945, No. 79.
13. Marston, supra note 7, at 411 (quoting letter from Governor Lehman's Legal Advisors,
to Leith-Ross (Oct. 7, 1943)).
14. Id. at 412 (quoting letter from Sir Donald Somervell to Leith Ross (Oct. 14, 1943)).
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After the creation of UNRRA in November 1943, its Council
recommended to the member governments that they should accord it the
facilities, privileges, immunities and exemptions which they accorded
each other and should grant immunity from legal process to the
representatives of member governments and employees of the Administration in respect of official acts as well as exemption from taxation on
official salaries. United Kingdom officials, including the AttorneyGeneral, met in February 1944 to consider the above recommendations.
The Attorney-General gave his provisional opinion that:
...even without an Act of Parliament, the British Courts, if faced by
an association of Governments such as that formed by UNRRA, should
accept this institution as a person having the necessary status to protect
its rights. He thought there was no need to put anything in an Act of
Parliament to protect these rights. Foreign governments possess
immunity; and UNRRA consisted of governments. There[fore] UNRRA
should have the same status as a foreign government. 5
Notwithstanding this opinion, the meeting considered that legislation
was advisable to avoid the ambiguities of the common law position
particularly in respect of immunities. In July 1944 the Government
introduced into Parliament the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Bill
which had amongst its purposes:
...to make provision as to the immunities, privileges and capacities
of international organisations of which Her Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom and foreign governments are members; to confer
immunities and privileges on the staffs of such organisations and
representatives of member governments and in respect of premises and
documents of such organisations; ...16

The Bill became law on November 17, 1944. It applied to, "any
organisation declared by Order in Council to be an organisation of which
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the government
or governments
of one or more foreign sovereign Powers are mem17
bers".
In essence, the Act enabled the executive, within limits specified in
the Act, to establish by Order in Council a legal status for such organisations and to confer immunities and privileges upon them, their officials

15. Id. at 413 (quoting Sir Donald Somervell, (Feb. 2, 1944)).
16. Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, ch. 44 (U.K.).
17. Id.
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and representatives of member States. Section 1(2)(a) provided:
His Majesty may by Order in Council - (a) provide that any organisation to which this section applies... shall, to such extent as may be
specified in the Order, have the immunities and privileges set out in
Part I of the Schedule to this
Act, and shall also have the legal
18
capacities of a body corporate.
The immunities and privileges envisaged were immunity from suit and
legal process, inviolability of archives and premises, and exemption from
rates and taxes, including exemption from taxes on the importation of
goods when directly imported by the organisation for its official use in
the United Kingdom.
Further provisions empowered the conferment on high officials of
the organisation (other than British subjects) and on representatives of
member governments to the organisation of the immunities and privileges
accorded to the envoys of foreign States, and the conferment on other
officials (including British subjects) of a certain functional immunity
from suit and exemption from rates and taxes.
During the debate in the House of Commons on the final form of
the Bill, which had been amended during its Parliamentary progress to
add to the original formulation of what became section 1(2)(a) the words
"and shall also have the legal capacities of a body corporate", the
question was asked: "The Amendment proposes that these organisations
shall have the legal capacity of a body corporate. Will that entitle them
to take legal proceedings in this country against British citizens?" The
Government Minister replied: "Yes, it will have that effect."19
Some important officials considered at this time that an international
organisation might have legal personality in the United Kingdom,
including immunities and privileges, even without the enactment of the
legislation, on the basis that an organisation was an association, or
partnership, of foreign sovereign States or governments. Thus the
Attorney-General, Somervell, whose views in committee have been
mentioned above, stated in the House of Commons:
"It may well be that, apart from Clause 1, our courts here would treat
an association of foreign Governments in the same way as they treat a
foreign Government; but it is desirable that the matter should be dealt
with by legislation, first of all to remove doubts ... ,2O

18. Id.
19. 403 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2771 (1944); Marston, supra note 7, at 421.
20. 403 PARL. Dai3., H.C. (5th ser.) 349 (1944); Marston, supra note 7, at 418.
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Beckett, in a briefing note for the Foreign Office Minister involved in
steering the Bill through its later Parliamentary stages, wrote:
"As the Attorney-General said, it is probable that UNRRA and similar
organisations would enjoy most or all of the privileges which it is the
purpose
of this Bill to provide at common law without legislation at
2
all"
IV.

FROM 1944 TO 1981: THE STATUTORY REGIME.

From the enactment of the 1944 Act, which was amended in
194622 and 1950 z and then consolidated,24 Orders in Council were
made concerning a large number of international organisations of which
the United Kingdom was a member. The treaties setting up the early
international organisations did not contain provisions expressly conferring
personality on the organisation in international law although they
specified or implied that the organisation was to have certain capacities
in the territories of the member States. Thus, the UNRRA treaty provided
that the Administration was to have the power amongst other things to
acquire, hold and convey property, to enter into contracts and undertake
obligations, and in general to perform any legal act appropriate to its
objects and purposes. The Order in Council concerning UNRRA, made
under the 1944 Act, conferred on it certain immunities and privileges and
"the legal capacities of a body corporate".25
A special case was the United Nations. The Charter did not contain
a provision expressly conferring international personality on the
Organisation. But Article 104 provided that it "shall enjoy in the territory
of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes", 26 while
Article 105 (1) and (2) stipulated for necessary privileges and immunities
in the territory of each of its members for the Organisation, its officials
and representatives of its members.27 The first Order dealing with the
21.

Marston, supra note 7, at 421 (quoting Brief by W.E. Beckett, Second Legal Advisor,

Foreign Office).
22. Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 66 (U.K.).
23. Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 7 (U.K.).
24. International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 14

(U.K.).
25. Diplomatic Privileges (U.N.ILR.A.) Order, S.I. 1945, No. 79.
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 104; IAN BROWNLIE, BAsic DOCUfENrS IN
(4th ed 1995) (Brownlie).
27. Id., art. 105.

INTERNATIONAL LAW I
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United Nations was the Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations Organization and Preparatory Commission) Order in Council, in force on
December 7, 1945.28 This conferred specified immunities and privileges
on the United Nations and its Preparatory Commission, and on specified
officials of these bodies and representatives to them of member
governments. The Order, however, did not expressly provide that the
above bodies were to have the capacities of bodies corporate. The status
to be enjoyed by the United Nations in the national legal .systems of
member States was later elaborated in the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, approved in February 1946.29
Article 1(1) of the Convention provides:
The United Nations shall possess juridical personality. It shall have the
capacity (a) to contract;
(b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property;
(c) to institute legal proceedings.3
The above status was given effect in United Kingdom law by the
Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice)
Order in Council 1947, 31 promulgated pursuant to the 1944 Act which
by this time had been amended by the Diplomatic Privileges (Extension)
Act 1946 in order to accommodate the privileges and immunities
contained in the above Convention.32 Its Article 2 read:
The United Nations shall have the legal capacity of a body corporate
and, except in so far as in any particular case it has expressly waived
its immunity, immunity from suit and legal process. No waiver of
immunity shall be deemed to extend to any measure of execution.33
It became usual in later treaties which established international

28. Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations Organization and Preparatory Commission) Order,
S.I. 1945, No. 1539; see also, John William Bridge, The United Nations and English Lim, 18
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 689 (1969). The International Court of Justice advised in the Reparations

Case that the United Nations had objective personality in international law. Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.CJ. 174.
29. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1
U.N.T.S. 15.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order, S.I. 1947,
No. 1772.
32. Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, supra note 22, §1(1), 2(b).
33. Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order, supranote
33, art. 2.
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organisations, however, for the member States to confer expressly on the
organisation such a status as "juridical personality" or "international
personality and legal capacity" or "legal personality". Whatever the
words of the treaty, the corresponding United Kingdom Order in Council
would confer a uniform status, namely "the legal capacity of a body
corporate".
Although Orders in Council under the 1944 Act, as later consolidated in 1950, defined the legal position of the majority of international
organisations in the United Kingdom during this period, there were a few
organisations whose local status was conferred by or pursuant to a
special Act of Parliament. One is the Commonwealth Secretariat,
established not by a formal treaty but at a meeting of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers in June 1965. The Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966
confers on the Secretariat "the legal capacities of a body corporate" and
gives it and its officials certain immunities and privileges.3 4
In 1964, the International Headquarters and Defence Organisations
Act 1964 was passed. It provided that, where in any arrangement for
common defence to which the United Kingdom was a party and where
it was proposed to establish a headquarters or defence organisation, Her
Majesty might by Order in Council designate the headquarters or
organisation and confer on it "the legal capacities of a body corporate"
with immunity from suit and legal process and inviolability of official
archives. s
In 1968 the Government introduced an International Organisations
Bill "to improve and bring up to date the legislation under which
international organisations function in the United Kingdom". 36 In
introducing the Bill in the House of Commons, the Government Minister
emphasized that a particular aim of the Bill was to provide a legal
framework which would encourage international organisations to
establish headquarters in the United Kingdom. The Minister concluded:
in broad terms the Bill is designed to enable us to treat internam..
tional organisations and their staff as well as they are treated in other
countries and in circumstances similar to those prevailing for the
missions of other countries and their diplomats. Our immediate
intention is to carry out our obligations to the one United Nations
Specialised Agency in the United Kingdom [the International Maritime
Consultative Organisation], and to regularise our relationship with the
34. Commonwealth Secretariat Act, 1966, ch. 10, §1(1) (U.K.).
35. International Headquarters and Defence Organisations Act, 1964, ch.5, §1(1) (U.K.).
36. 766 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1264 (1968).
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London
Delegation of the Commission of the European Communi37
ties.
Like the earlier legislation, the 1968 Act enabled the executive to
confer a legal status on an international organisation to which the United
Kingdom and one or more foreign sovereign States were members, as
well as privileges and immunities on it, its officials and representatives
of its member States. The status specified in section 1(2)(a) of the Act
was again "the legal capacities of a body corporate".3 8 The 1968 Act
went further than its predecessors in enabling the conferment of a similar
status, privileges and immunities on the Commission of the European
Communities39 and on other international organisations to which the

United Kingdom was not a member where, in the latter case, the
organisation maintained or proposed to maintain an establishment in the
United Kingdom.
The Act also contained provisions for the situation where a
specialised agency of the United Nations was to have its headquarters in
the United Kingdom. In practice, where it was intended that the
headquarters of an organisation should be established in the United
Kingdom, a headquarters treaty was concluded between the organisation
and the United Kingdom under authority contained in the convention
establishing the organisation. This headquarters treaty would specify the
legal status and powers which the organisation was to enjoy in the
United Kingdom. It would then be implemented by an Order in Council
under the 1968 Act.
An example, worth singling out because it led to one of the cases
mentioned at the beginning of this article, was that provided by the
Fourth International Tin Agreement. Article 16(1), referring to the
International Tin Council, read:
The Council shall have legal personality. It shall in particular have the
capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable
property and to institute legal proceedings.4"
Article 16(4) read:
The status, privileges and immunities of the Council in the territory of

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1264-65.
International Organisations Act, 1968, ch. 48 (U.K.).
The United Kingdom did not become a member ofthe European Communities until 1973.
Fourth International Tin Agreement, in United Nations Tin Conference, U.N. Doc.

TD/TIN.4/7/Rev.1 (1970).
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the host Government shall be governed by a Headquarters Agreement
between the host Government and the Council.41
On February 9, 1972, a Headquarters Agreement was concluded between
the United Kingdom Government and the ITC. Its Article 3 provided:
The Council shall have legal personality. It shall in particular have the
capacity to contract and to acquire and dispose of movable and
immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.42
The Headquarters Agreement also provided for the inviolability of
the ITC's premises (art.5) and archives (art. 4), its general immunity
from jurisdiction (art. 8), taxes (art.9) and duties (art. 10), and for
specific privileges and immunities for its Chairman (art. 17), staff
members (art. 18) and experts (art. 19). It required that any formal
contract between the ITC and a United Kingdom legal person should
contain an arbitration clause and provided that immunity should not
apply to the enforcement of an arbitration award (art. 23). On the same
day, the International Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order
1972, promulgated pursuant to the International Organisations Act 1968,
came into force.43 This stated in its Article 5, that "[t]he Council shall
have the legal capacities of a body corporate." It went on to confer the
inviolability, immunities and privileges as set out in the Headquarters
Agreement except with respect to the enforcement of an arbitration
award.
The period following the enactment of the 1968 Act saw the
promulgation of a considerable number of Orders in Council, some of
them in association with headquarters agreements between the United
Kingdom and the international organisation. The 1968 Act was amended
by the International Organisations Act 1981 so as, amongst other things,
to include organisations composed entirely of those States of the British
Commonwealth which were excluded from the scope of the earlier
legislation as they were not "foreign". Its scope was also widened to
include international commodity organisations of a specified description
to which the United Kingdom was not a member.

41. Id.
42. 1972 U.K. T.S. No. 38 (Cmnd. 4869).
1972, No. 120.
43. E.g., International Tin Council (Immunities and Privileges) Order, S.I.

44. Id.
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V. THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW.
Quite apart from the difficulty in placing an international organisation in the scheme of legal persons known to English law, two nonjusticiability principles of English law appear to cause further difficulties
for international organisations, created as they are by dealings among
sovereign States, usually by treaty.
1. The principle of the non-justiciability of questions of
international law and relations.
As long ago as 1848, Lord Chancellor Cottenham stated in the
House of Lords with regard to an instrument drawn up between two
sovereigns:
It is true, the bill states that the instrument was contrary to the laws of
Hanover and Brunswick, but notwithstanding that it is so stated, still if
it is a sovereign act, then, whether it be according to law or not, we
cannot inquire into it.45
In 1859, it was stated by Lord Kingsdown in the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in an appeal from a court in British India:
The transactions of independent states between each other are governed
by other laws than those which municipal courts administer; such courts
have neither the means of deciding what is right, nor the power of
enforcing any decision which they make.4
This view was not confined to England. In 1897, a unanimous
Supreme Court of the United States in Underhill v. Hernandez stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves.47
The doctrine returned across the Atlantic to England in Buttes Gas

45.
46.
47.

Brunswick v. Hanover, 9 Eng. Rep. 993, 1000 (H.L. 1848).
Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 15 Eng. Rep. 9,28-9 (P.C. 1859).
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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& Oil Ltd. v. Hammer.48 Lord Wilberforce, in delivering the unanimous
judgment of the House of Lords on the question of the justiciability in
English courts of the extent of territory dispute between foreign
sovereign States, considered whether there existed in English law a more
general principle that the courts will not adjudicate upon the transactions
of foreign sovereign States:
In my opinion there is, and for long has been, such a general principle,
starting in English law, adopted and generalised in the law of the
United States of America which is effective and compelling in English
courts. This principle is not one of discretion, but is inherent in the
very nature of the judicial process.49
After citing the above cases, amongst others, Lord Wilberforce
described the issues relevant in the litigation before him:
It would not be difficult to elaborate on these considerations, or to
perceive other important inter-state issues and/or issues of international
law which would face the court. They have only to be stated to compel
the conclusion that these are not issues upon which a municipal court
can pass.5"
Diplock L.J. in the English Court of Appeal case of Buck v.
Attorney-Generalsupported the concept of non-justiciability in the above
circumstances. 5' He wrote of the rules of comity observed by the United
Kingdom Government that apply between State and State and continued:
One of those rules is that it does not purport to exercise jurisdiction
over the internal affairs of any other independent state, or to apply
measures of coercion to it or to its property, except in accordance with
the rules of public international law.52
2. The principle of the non-justiciability of treaties which
have not been incorporated into English law, including
those to which the United Kingdom is a party.
Treaties are supremely "transactions" between sovereign States and
the principle of non-justiciability causes many issues concerning them to

48. [1982J A.C. 888; (Buttes); see David Lloyd Jones, Act ofForeign State in English Law:
The Ghost Goes East, 22 VA. J. INTL L. 433 (1982).

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 932.
Id. at 938.
[1965] 1 Ch. 745 (Eng. C.A.).
Id. at 770.
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be non-justiciable in the courts. Thus, English courts cannot determine
whether a treaty has been broken, 53 or how it should be interpreted 4
or whether it should be enforced.5 5 This is so regardless of whether the
United Kingdom is a party to the treaty.
The first principle of non-justiciability discussed above is supported
by considerations of public international law. The second principle of
non-jusiciability is supported by considerations of British constitutional
law. These are (i) that the treaty-making power lies in the Crown as an
incident of the foreign affairs prerogative, and the exercise of the
prerogative by the Crown cannot be examined by the courts,56 (ii) that
the Crown cannot, without Parliamentary authority, alter the law of the
land. 7 Thus, while under (i) the courts cannot determine whether the
Crown should or should not enter into a treaty,58 under (ii) the courts
will not permit, without Parliamentary authority, a treaty entered into by
the Crown to create new rights for individuals or to impose new legal
obligations on individuals or to take away from individuals any legal
right hitherto possessed. It was on the basis of (ii) that Sir Robert
Phillimore gave his celebrated judgment in The ParlementBeige where
a treaty between Great Britain and Belgium, not incorporated by
Parliamentary legislation in Britain, provided for the exemption from
detention in one State of mail-ships belonging to the Government of the
other. 9 He observed:
If the Crown had power without the authority of parliament by this
treaty to order that the ParlementBelge should be entitled to all the
privileges of a ship of war, then the wan-ant, which is prayed for
against her as a wrong-doer on account of the collision, cannot issue,
and the right of the subject, but for this order unquestionable, to
recover damages for the injuries done to him by her is extinguished.
This is a use of the treaty-making prerogative of the Crown which I
believe to be without precedent, and in principle contrary to the laws
of the constitution.60
In order for the terms of a treaty to be justiciable before English

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985J 1 A.C. 58, 85-6.
Id.
Rustomjee v. The Queen, (1876) 2 Q.B.D. 69, 74.
Id.
Id.
Blackburn v. Attorney Gen., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1040 (Eng. C.A.).
(1879) 4 P.D. 129-36.
Id. at 154.
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courts, the treaty has either to be expressly given the force of law
through Parliamentary legislation 6 ' or, where this is not done, a treaty
text may still be examined in the case of an ambiguity in the legislation
with the view to reconciling the ambiguity in favour of conformity with
the United Kingdom's treaty obligation. 62
VI.

THE LmGATION.

By 1981, detailed primary legislation was in place enabling the legal
position of international organisations in the United Kingdom to be
defined. This statutory regime was applied in practice through the Orders
in Council to an increasing number and variety of international organisations. Problems arising out of this regime, if there were any, rarely
reached the English courts. One of the few cases which did was Zoernsch
v. Waldock and McNulty. 63 There, the plaintiff claimed damages in the
English courts from the first defendant, as President of the European
Commission of Human Rights, and the second defendant, as secretary to
the Commission, for "negligence and corruption" after the plaintiff's
petition to the Commission, alleging a denial of justice in the courts of
the Federal Republic of Germany, was rejected. The defendants claimed
"immunity from legal process" under a provision in the Council of
Europe (Immunities and Privileges) Order 19 6 0 ' promulgated under the
International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act 1950.65 The
Court of Appeal held that as a matter of interpretation the provision
applied to the facts of the case and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. It is
significant to note that the relevant Convention to which the United
Kingdom was a member, the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, was not itself incorporated into
United Kingdom law by statute or any other means.
The near absence of litigation which by the early 1980s characterised the implementation of the statutory regime in the United Kingdom
was destined not to last. Three major pieces of litigation have caused a
profound examination to be made of the status of international organisa-

61.

E.g., Carriage by Air Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 27 (U.I.) (dealing with the 1929

Warsaw Convention and the 1955 Hague Protocol); Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., [1981] A.C.
251 (H.L. 1980).
62. E.g., Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 44 (U.K.); Salomon

v. Comm'r of Customs & Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116.
63. [1964] 2 All E.R. 256 (Zoemsch).
64. S.I. 1960, No. 442, pt.1 §2.

65. Supra note 24, art. 2.
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tions in English law. In the first case the organisation was one of which
the United Kingdom was a member and for which an Order in Council
under the International Organisations Acts had been made. In the second
and third cases, the United Kingdom was not a member of the organisations concerned, and no Orders had been made in their regard.
1. The International Tin Council Litigation ("Tin").
The International Tin Council ("ITC") was established by the first
International Tin Agreement in 1956 and to this, and the five subsequent
agreements, the United Kingdom was a party. At the time of the
litigation the Sixth International Tin Agreement ("ITA6") was in force.
It has already been described above how a headquarters agreement and
an Order in Council in 1972 established the ITC in London with "the
legal capacities of a body corporate".
One of the main functions of the ITC under ITA6, as under the
earlier agreements, was to provide for adjustment between world
production and consumption of tin and to prevent excessive fluctuations
in the price of tin. To carry out this function the ITC operated a system
of tin price stabilisation through the operation of a buffer stock of tin,
financed by contributions and loans from the member States. The ITC
purchased or sold tin, depending on the level of the market price, through
contracts for immediate and forward delivery. The state of the market
caused increasing intervention on the part of the ITC, usually through
forward contracts, in an effort to support the tin price. This in turn
increased the ITC's exposure to the risk that its available assets would
not cover liabilities falling due. The worst happened on October 24, 1985
when the ITC announced that it could not meet its obligations falling due
on the London Metal Exchange. The ITC's creditors in the United
Kingdom - to a total of several hundred million pounds - consisted
mainly of brokers, with whom it had concluded contracts to buy or sell
tin, and banks which had advanced loans to it. The brokers' contracts
contained arbitration clauses so that the creditors were able to obtain
awards against the ITC, whereas the banks' contracts did not contain
such clauses. The ITC, however, did not possess enough funds to meet
the awards or settle the debts.
The insolvency of an international organisation was an unprecedented event. As it became obvious that the member States of the ITC were
unable or unwilling to give the ITC the means of settling its debts, and
the ITC itself had inadequate assets of its own to satisfy the claims, the
creditors decided to obtain redress in the English courts from the ITC's
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members which consisted at the time of the United Kingdom, twenty-two
other sovereign States and the European Economic Community. Three
different methods of recovery were tried by the creditors.
A.

The winding-up action.

A broker who had obtained an arbitration award against the ITC
sought to have it compulsorily wound up as an unregistered company
within the scope of the Companies Act 1985, so that its liquidator might
enforce the liability of the member States to contribute to paying the
debts of the ITC. The ITC responded by asserting that it was not subject
to the winding-up jurisdiction and that in any case it was immune under
the 1972 Order. The action came before Millett J. in the Chancery
Division of the High Court. He first held that the status, capacities and
immunities of the ITC in English law were governed by the 1968 Act
and the 1972 Order, and not by the treaties. 66 He went on:
Its existence is recognised by the 1972 Order, which has granted it the
legal capacities of a body corporate, but it is not incorporated thereby,
and it is not a statutory body. It is not incorporated in the United
Kingdom or anywhere else. It is neither an English nor a foreign
corporation, but the creation of treaty.67
Millett J. then held that the court had no jurisdiction to wind up the
ITC, since the Companies Act could not be interpreted as being
applicable to an international organisation as otherwise the courts would
have to interpret and enforce treaties. In the present case, the winding up
of the ITC by the English courts would put the United Kingdom in
breach of its own treaty obligations to the ITC and its other members.
The judge continued:
Sovereign states are free, if they wish, to carry on a collective
enterprise through the medium of an ordinary commercial company
incorporated in the territory of one of their number. But if they choose
instead to carry it on through the medium of an international organisation, no one member state, by executive, legislative or judicial action,
can assume the management of the enterprise and subject it to its own
domestic law.6"
Finally, Millett J. held that a winding-up process against the ITC fell

66. In re International Tin Council, [1987] 1 Ch. 419, 442-43.
67. Id. at 443.
68. Id. at 452.
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within the immunity from suit and legal process conferred on the ITC by
the 1972 Order and did not fall within the exception to immunity which
the Order provided "in respect of the enforcement of an arbitration
69
award", since a winding-up procedure was not such an "enforcement".
The Court of Appeal dismissed the broker's appeal, being "in broad
agreement" with the reasoning of Millett j.70
B.

The receivershipaction.

Another broker who had obtained an arbitration award against the
ITC went one stage further and obtained leave from the court, under
power in the Arbitration Act 1950, to enforce the award in the same
manner as a judgment. The broker then applied to the court for the
appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution over what was
argued to be the right of the ITC to be indemnified by or to demand
contribution from its members for the purposes of satisfying the
judgment. This case, too, came before Millett J. who rejected the
application.7 1 He considered that for the application to succeed the ITC
must have an arguable cause of action against the members capable of
being taken over by the receiver and which the court can entertain.72 If
there was such a cause of action it could only be derived from ITA6, a
treaty which had not been made part of English law and whose terms
were not enforceable in an English court.73
The Court of Appeal dismissed the broker's appeal for reasons
which were substantially similar to those of Millett J.74 A difference,
however, appeared among the members of the court on one point. Ralph
Gibson L.J. held that any claim which a receiver might advance against
the ITA members was non-justiciable in the English courts on the
7
principles stated by Lord Wilberforce in Buttes Gas & Oil v. Hammer.1
On the other hand, Kerr L.J., with whom Nourse L.J. agreed, was not
convinced that the "act of state non-justiciability" as applied in Buttes
extended to claims based on agreements concluded by States in a
commercial context; if it were so extended, State immunity, abolished in
commercial transactions by the State Immunity Act 1978, might "return

69. Id. at 454-56.
70. In re International Tin Council, [1989] 1 Ch.309.

71. Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. v. International Tin Council, [1988] 1 Ch. 1.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 23.

74. Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. v. International Tin Council (No. 2), [1989] 1 ch. 286.
75.

Buttes, supra note 48, at 931-32.
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by the back door under the guise of act of state non-justiciability".
An appeal was then dismissed by the House of Lords. Lord Oliver,
supported by three of their Lordships, stated:
I agree with Millett J. and with the Court of Appeal that, however the
matter is approached, any claim of the ITC against the member States
for indemnity must ultimately rest upon ITA6. This is an issue which
is not justiciable by your Lordships and it is therefore unnecessary to
decide whether, in any event, any
such claim would also be precluded
76
by act of state non-justiciability.
The fifth member, Lord Templeman, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that any indemnity obligation on the members of ITA6 "is a treaty
obligation which cannot be enforced by the courts of the United
Kingdom by the appointment of a receiver or otherwise because the
obligation is not to be found in the Order of 1972"."
C. The "direct" actions.
The two methods of recovery already discussed constituted mere
skirmishing in comparison with the third method tried. Eleven brokers
and six banks sued the members of the ITC for damages for breach of
tin contracts and loan contracts respectively. The defendants sought to
have the claims struck out as disclosing no good cause of action or as
being non-justiciable or, except for the United Kingdom, on the ground
of the defendants' immunity. The plaintiffs advanced the following three
main submissions:
(i) That in English law the ITC was not a legal person distinct from its
members and that the latter could therefore be sued directly and
collectively;
(ii) That even if the ITC was a legal person distinct from its members
the latter were liable concurrently with it or, alternatively, the members
owed a secondary liability to creditors if the ITC failed to meet its
debts. This submission was put on alternative grounds: (a) that under
English law incorporation, and incorporation only, removes the liability
of persons who had banded together to trade under a collective name;
or (b) that under international law the members of an international
organisation are liable for the organisation's obligations to third parties
and this rule must be applied by English courts under either the general

76. Appeal dismissed sub. norm J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and
Industry, et al., [1990] 2 A.C. 418, at 522.
77. Id. at 482.

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 2:75

principles of English conflict of laws as the proper law of the organisation or under international law rules of automatic incorporation in
English law under the doctrine expounded in cases such as Trendtex
Trading Corporationv. CentralBank of Nigeria7 8; or
(iii) That even if the ITC were a separate legal person in English law,
the constitution of ITA6 established a general authority in the ITC to
contract in respect of buffer stock operations as agents for each of its
members.
In opposition to these submissions, the members submitted that the
contracts had been made solely with the ITA as a legal person separate
from the members, that there was no "constitutional agency" and that in
any event the members, with the exception of the United Kingdom, were
immune from suit under the State Immunity Act 1978. The plaintiffs'
arguments were rejected by Staughton J. at first instance.79
A separate claim by a broker against the United Kingdom Government alone was struck out by Millett J. in a later judgment in which he
stated:
Staughton J. has held that 'whilst the ITC is not a corporation or a
body corporate for the internal regulation of its affairs under the
Companies Act, in its dealings with others, and in particular when
considering the effect of contracts that it may make, it is to be treated
as if it were a body corporate.' I would prefer simply to say that, by
conferring on the ITC the legal capacities of a body corporate, Parliament has granted it sufficient legal personality to enable it to incur
liabilities on its own account which are not the liabilities of its
members.80
Appeals from both judgments were dismissed by the Court of
Appeal." In short, all three judges held that the ITC was a legal person
in English law separate from its members and that the contracts had been
made with the ITC and not with the members either directly or through
the ITC as agent. In the course of reaching this conclusion, however, a
difference emerged over the question whether the terms of ITA6 could
be examined to help determine the nature of the ITC's legal personality
and thereby whether its members could be liable to third parties if the

78. [1977] 1 Q.B. 529.
79. [1987] Butterworth's Company Law Cases 687.
80. Maclaine Watson and Co. Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade and Industry, [1987] Butterworth's
Company Law Cases 707.
81.

C.A.).

J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade and Industry, [1989] 1 Ch. 72 (Eng.
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ITC defaulted on contractual obligations. Ralph Gibson L.J. considered
that as ITA6 had not been incorporated into English law its terms could
not be examined by the courts.82 Kerr and Nourse L.JJ., however, took
a different view. Kerr L.J. observed of the doctrine of the non-justiciability of unincorporated treaties:
The constitutional reason underlying it is the historical predominance
of Parliament over the executive in relation to the power to make laws.
Viewed in that way, there seems no harm in permitting resort to ITA6
for the purpose of establishing who, on the plane of international law,
is liable for the debts of the ITC; on the contrary, justice and good
sense point to the contrary conclusion. Moreover, the claims of the
doctrine of non-justiciability are particularly weak in cases such as the
present, since the Order in Council of 1972 refers expressly to the
Headquarters Agreement and ITA6 (to be read for ITA4). That appears
to be an unprecedented hybrid situation between an incorporated and
wholly unincorporated treaty.83
Only Nourse L.J., however, found a sufficient basis for dissent. He
considered that although in English law the ITC was a legal person
separate from its members, there was sufficient support in international
law for the members of an international organisation being liable to a
third party for the debts of the organisation. He relied for this conclusion
on the writings of certain jurists and in particular on passages in an
International Chamber of Commerce arbitral award of 1984 between
Westland Helicopters Ltd. and the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, an entity established by a treaty concluded by Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and UAE.' 4 Nourse L.J. concluded:
... I have come to the conclusion that, judged objectively, the
intention of the states who were parties to ITA6 was that the members
of the ITC should be liable for its obligations. 85
The Court of Appeal held that the member States of the ITC (other
than the United Kingdom) would not have been immune from suit, if the
plaintiffs had possessed a valid cause of action against them, since the
plaintiffs' claims would fall within the exceptions to sovereign immunity
laid down in the State Immunity Act 1978. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeal held unanimously that the EEC - which was conceded not to be

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 180.
80 I.L.R. 596 (ICC, Ct. of Arbit. 1985).
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a State and to be outside the scope of the State Immunity Act 1978 - was
not entitled to sovereign immunity rationepersonae in English common
law, despite the acknowledgment of its personality in international law
and the fact that its "legal personality" was embodied in Article 210 of
the Treaty of Rome 8 6, a treaty incorporated into English law by s. 2 of
the European Communities Act 1972.87 Having considered that such
immunity must depend on the recognition by the State of the forum of
a par in parem relationship, Kerr L.J. stated: "In the present case there
has been no recognition of any immunity of the EEC by anyone."' 88
On appeal to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the
proceedings - which included the appeal on the receivership issue occupied 26 days, one of the lengthiest appeals to the House in history. 9 The same range of arguments was deployed by the appellants
(except that the question of the immunity of the EEC was left unargued)
and all their arguments were unanimously rejected. Delivering the most
detailed judgment, Lord Oliver, with whose reasons Lords Keith,
Brandon and Griffiths agreed, considered at the outset the question of the
justiciability or otherwise of ITA6 and the Headquarters Agreement in
determining the rights of the parties. Having endorsed the general
principle of the non-justiciability of the transactions of sovereign States,
Lord Oliver also reiterated the principle that the Crown, under its treatymaking prerogative, could not alter the law without the intervention of
Parliamentary legislation.9" But he went on to consider that although a
treaty was a fact and could be looked at where it was necessary to do so
as part of the factual background, "the legal results which flow from [a
treaty] in international law, whether between the parties inter se or
between the parties and any of them91and outsiders are not and they are
not justiciable by municipal courts".
Lord Oliver went on to hold (contrary to the assertion that ITC was
not a legal personality) that the 1972 Order had created the ITC as a
legal person separate from its members, even though it was not a body

86. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 210, in 2 BAsic DocmiNs OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 45 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald

A. Brand, eds., 1990).
87. European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, §2 (U.K.).
88. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd., [1989] 1 Ch. at 200.
89. Reported as J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade and Industry, et al., [1990]
2 A.C. 418.

90. Id. at 500.
91. Id. at 501.
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corporate, and that the contracts had been made with it.92 Likewise, he
rejected the contention that English law incorporation was needed to
remove liability, on the ground that there was no evidence that it was
intended that any person other than the ITC should be liable.93
As to the international law assertion of member liability, Lord
Oliver first held that it was United Kingdom legislation and not
international law which created the entity which had entered into the
contracts9 4 and that the liability of the members, if it existed, could be
based only on the terms of ITA6, the construction of which was nonjusticiable in the English courts. 95 As for the sub-argument based on the
direct incorporation of international law into English law, Lord Oliver
considered that even if there was a rule in international law that member
States were secondarily liable to third parties for an organisation's debts
unless the treaty expressly excluded such liability - which on the
evidence he was unable to accept - the courts would still be called upon
to derive rights from an unincorporated treaty.96
Finally, Lord Oliver rejected the "constitutional agency" argument,
(C), since this would invite the court "to embark upon the exercise of
interpreting the terms of the treaty and ascertaining, on the basis of that
determination, the rights of the members in international law and the
consequences in municipal law of the rights so determined". 97
A shorter and more forceful judgment was given by Lord Templeman, with whose reasons Lord Keith, Brandon and Griffiths likewise
agreed. He maintained that the appellant's submissions, if accepted,
"would involve a breach of the British constitution and an invasion by
the judiciary of the functions of the Government and of Parliament". 9 8
Having stressed the non-justiciability of unincorporated treaties, he
considered that the present case turned on a short question of construction, the meaning of the 1972 Order, and in particular the words "the
Council shall have the legal capacities of a body corporate".9 9 He
rejected the lack of personality argument on the ground that the 1972
Order "brought into being an entity which must be recognised by the
courts of the United Kingdom as a legal personality distinct in law from

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

503.
508.
509-10.
510.

96. Id. at 512.

97. Id. at 515.
98. Id. at 476.
99. Id. at 477-79.

HOFSTRA LAW & POLICY SYMPOSIUM

[Vol. 2:75

100
its membership and capable of entering into contracts as principal".
Lord Templeman rejected the English law incorporation contention on
the ground that sufficient evidence had not been found to displace the
general proposition that in England no one is liable on a contract except
the parties thereto." 1 As for the argument for member liability under
international law, Lord Templeman held that no plausible evidence had
been produced for the existence of such a rule of international law. In his
words, "the rule of international law could only be enforced under
international law" and "Public international law cannot alter the meaning
and effect of United Kingdom legislation."' 2 Finally, Lord Templeman
rejected the ITC constitutional arguments by finding no ambiguity in the
1972 Order and being unable therefore to employ the provisions of the
unincorporated ITA6 for the purpose of altering or contradicting the
Order's provisions.0 3
Shortly after delivery of the House of Lords decision, it was
announced that the members of ITA6 had arrived at a financial settlement with the creditors of the ITC.

2. The Arab Monetary Fund Litigation ("AMF").
In the middle of the 1970s, concern had arisen in London banking
circles as to whether loans could effectively be made to two banks, the
International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) and the International Investment Bank (JIB), both established by treaty among the
members of COMECON, an organisation whose members were States of
the Communist bloc. The United Kingdom was not a member of
COMECON, had not concluded any agreement with it or the banks, and
there was no Order under the 1968 Act in respect of it or the banks. It
appears that the treaties establishing the banks had provided for them to
have legal personality in their member States, at least in the State where
each had its seat or permanent location. Doubt arose over the legal status
of the banks in English law, including the basic question of whether they
were English legal persons at all, capable of suing and being sued in the
English courts. Such a question was logically prior to the question
whether, assuming they were legal persons, they had immunity to some

100.
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degree or another. In the end, no loans were made.1 4 On April 21,
1978, the Deputy Chairman of the Bank of England, Sir Jasper Hollom,
sought the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on two
questions:
(a) What position does the Foreign and Commonwealth Office take
concerning the legal personality and capacity in English law of entities
[of the above kind]?
(b) If an English court were to consider it necessary to receive from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office a statement regarding the attitude
of the Executive in relation to the question of the personality and
capacity of such an entity, what would be your position?'
On May 8, 1978, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr F. Judd, gave the Government's view. As to question
(a), he stated that such entities "would enjoy legal personality and
capacity in this country, without any formal statement by or on behalf of
Her Majesty's Government, in the same way and to the same extent as
any other banking, commercial or other trading organisation established
in a country other than the United Kingdom and enjoying legal personality and capacity in that country"." 6 Such personality and capacity,
would, it was considered, be acknowledged by the English courts. As to
question (b), he replied that the capacity of such an entity to enter into
a contract and to sue or be sued did not depend on recognition by the
United Kingdom Government, but if the Government's attitude were
sought the Foreign and Commonwealth Office "would be willing
officially to acknowledge that the entity concerned enjoyed such legal
personality and capacity", once satisfied that the entity had legal
personality and capacity to enter into the particular transaction under the
law of one or more of its member States or the State where it had its seat
or permanent location.'0 7
Ten years after this exchange of letters, a relevant case came before
the English courts. The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) was established by

104. The factual background is gleaned from brief accounts in A. Lawyer, The Problems of
Lending to Someone Who Isn't Quite There, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1978, at 64; see also, PHILIP WOOD,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 39 (1980).

105. Letter from Sir Jasper Hollom, Deputy Chairman, The Bank ofEngland,to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (Apr. 21, 1978), reprinted in Geoffrey Marston (ed.), United Kingdom
Materialson InternationalLaw, 1978 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 329, 346-48.
106. Letter from F. Judd, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to Sir Jasper
Hollom, Deputy Chairman, The Bank of England (May 8, 1978), reprinted in Geoffrey Marston
(ed.), UnitedKingdom Materialson InternationalLaw, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.329, 347 (1978).
107. Id. at 34748.
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an agreement in 1976 between twenty Arab States, together with
"Palestine". The treaty provided that the AVIF was to have "an independent juridical personality" and the right to sue, contract and litigate. Its
headquarters were to be in Abu Dhabi, part of the State of the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). By a UAE decree in 1977 which made binding
the Articles of Association setting up the AMF in the UAE, the AMF
was given legal personality and the right to sue and be sued in the UAE,
The other member States acted similarly.
In 1988, AMF brought proceedings in the English courts for
damages, tracing orders and other relief against Hashim, formerly its
Director-General, members of his family, banks and other financial
institutions over the alleged misappropriation by Hashim from the AMF
of some $50 million, and its subsequent "laundering".!0 8 The United
Kingdom was not a party to the 1976 agreement and had not incorporated it in any way into United Kingdom law and the defendants argued
that the AMF was the product of a non-justiciable treaty and was
consequently not a legal person capable of bringing legal proceedings in
England.
At first instance, before Hoffmann 3., the AMF argued that (i) the
English conflict of laws rules recognised the legal existence of entities
created by public international law, where public international law was
their proper law, or, alternatively, (ii) the AMF was entitled to be
recognised as a legal person known to English law by virtue of the rule
of conflict of laws expounded in Dicey & Morris, namely: "The
existence ...of a foreign corporation duly created ...under the law
of a foreign country is recognised in England." 1" These arguments
had been advanced while the Yin appeals above were awaiting decision
in the House of Lords and on delivery of that decision the AvF
abandoned argument (i). In later giving judgment, Hoffmann J.stated
that he would have been attracted to argument (i) observing:
Extending our conflicts rule to international organisations seems to me
sensible and practical ....It is difficult to see why an entity created
by treaty between two or more foreign states should be less entitled to
recognition than an entity created under the sovereign authority of a
single foreign state within its domestic system." 0
He cited the Hollom-Judd correspondence as indicating that the

108. Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3), [1991] 2 A.C. 114, (AMF).
109. Id.; 2 DICEY & MORRIs, THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 1107-11 (12th ed. 1993).
110. AMF, supra note 106, at 119-20.
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British Government did not consider that formal executive recognition
was the key to legal personality in the United Kingdom. If such
recognition were required then the correspondence showed that the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was prepared to give it in a form of
which judicial notice would be taken."' However, passages from the
judgment of Lord Oliver in the Y1n case in which he had stated, amongst
other things, that "without the Order in Council the ITC had no existence
in the law of the United Kingdom" were considered by Hoffmann J. to
"destroy the possibility of a common law conflict rule under which the
courts can
recognise the existence of an international organisation as
2
such"."

On argument (ii), Hoffmann I remarked:
...the consequence of the TIn case, as I see it, is that I ignore the
treaty and regard the A.M.F. as constituted under Abu Dhabi law as a
separate persona ficta. As such, it is entitled to recognition as a
domestic entity under ordinary conflicts rules.
11
Hoffmann I acknowledged that if the AMF had been given legal
personality under the laws of other member States, this would entail the
existence of other emanations of the Fund and he added that "[tlhis raises
questions of trinitarian subtlety into which I am grateful that I need not
1 .
enter. '~~14
The Court of Appeal by a majority (Lord Donaldson M.R. and
Nourse L.J.) allowed the defendants' appeal on the ground that the AAiF
remained the creation of a treaty non-justiciable in English law, and that
as the UAE decree had given effect to the treaty solely within UAE
territory it had not created a UAE entity capable of being recognised
under the English conflicts rule." 5 Lord Donaldson M.R. considered
that without "the magic wand of an Order in Council" the AMF was not
a person which English courts could see." 6 Bingham L.J., dissenting,
considered that comity required that the English courts should recognise
the AMF, as the AIMF was relying on personality conferred not by a nonjusticiable treaty but by the UAE decree." 7
On appeal to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, where
at 112.
Id. at 123.

111. Id.
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counsel for the AMF declined an invitation to re-open argument (i)
above, the defendants argued that there was no longer any room for the
application of the domestic conflicts rule where there was, as here, a
statutory scheme in place."' This was the International Organisations
Act 1968-81 which had not been applied to the AMF - no Order in
Council, therefore no legal personality in English law; furthermore, the
AMF was created by a non-justiciable treaty and not by the UAE decree
which had simply acknowledged an existing entity." 9 By a majority,
AMF's appeal was allowed. 120 Lord Templeman, with whom Lords
Bridge, Griffiths and Ackner concurred, held that "when the AMF
agreement was registered in the UAE by means of Federal Decree No.
35 that registration conferred on the international organisation legal
personality and thus created a corporate body which the English courts
can and-should recognise"; 12 1 furthermore, the House of Lords' decision in the YIn case had not affected this possibility. Dealing with the
"trinitarian subtlety" argument - namely that as the AMF had been
created as a legal person in all the other member States it was impossible
to determine which person's money had been misappropriated - Lord
Templeman stated: "... though the Fund was incorporated by 21 States
and has multiple incorporation and multiple nationality there is only one
Fund with its head office in Abu Dhabi, one board of governors, one
executive board of directors and one director-general".'2 He then
referred to the view of the British Government expressed in the HollomJudd correspondence. It had stated that a prior requirement for the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office's "acknowledgment" of the legal
personality and capacity of an international organisation in the United
Kingdom was its enjoyment "under its constitutive instrument or
instruments and under the law of one or more member states or the state
wherein it has its seat or permanent location, [of] legal personality and
capacity to engage in transactions of the type concerned governed by the
law of the non-member State"." Lord Templeman added: "This
requirement is necessary because the courts in the United Kingdom
cannot enforce treaty rights but they can recognise legal entities created

118.

Id. at 151-52.
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by the laws of one or more sovereign states."12 4 On several occasions
during his judgment, Lord Templeman stated that the UAE Decree had
"created" the AF as "a corporate body," and referring back to Tin he
also stated that the 1972 Order had "created" the ITC "a corporate
body"."~ Yet it was regarded as common ground in Tin that the Order
had not "created" a body corporate or a corporation. 26 This use of
words by Lord Templeman was to cause debate in the third litigation
discussed below.
Dissenting, Lord Lowry considered that the AMf had not been
"created" by the UAE decree but by the non-justiciable treaty; to permit
it to sue in the English courts would be inconsistent with the policy of
the International Organisations Act 1968-8.127
3.

The Arab Organisation for Industrialisation Litigation
("Aor').

In the Court of Appeal proceedings in Yin (mentioned above)
Nourse L.J. had relied in particular on passages in an International
Chamber of Commerce arbitral award involving Westland Helicopters
Ltd., a company incorporated in England, and the Arab Organisation for
Industrialisation (AOI). The latter had been established by a treaty
concluded in 1975 by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE with "the
juridical personality and all rights and powers to perform its activities
within the participating States" and with its headquarters in Cairo, Egypt.
The aim of the AOI was to create an Arab arms manufacturing industry,
mainly for the confrontation with Israel. The executive bodies of AOI
comprised representatives of the four member States. Pursuant to the
treaty each member State passed implementing legislation giving legal
personality to the AOI in each State but, in accordance with the terms of
the treaty, excluding AOI from the application of local law. The AOI set
up large industrial plants. It also deposited funds abroad, including
accounts in six banks in London.
In 1978, the AOI entered into a contract with Westland - the
"Shareholders' Agreement" - for the manufacture and sale of helicopters
in Egypt by a joint-venture Egyptian company. The agreement provided

124. Id.
125. Id. at 165.
126. Maclaine Watson & Co., [1988] 1 Ch. at 16 (Millett, J.); Maclaine Watson & Co., [1989]
1 Ch. at 167 (Kerr, L.J.); J.H. Rayner Ltd., [1990] 2 A.C. at 501 (Lord Oliver).

127. Arab Monetary Fund, [1991] 2 A.C. 114, 167.
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for International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration in the event of
a dispute. When Egypt concluded the Camp David Agreements in 1978
and the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979, the other three member States
of the AOI considered that these actions were incompatible with the aims
of the AOI. Those states withdrew their representatives from its executive
bodies and set up a "liquidation committee" in Saudi Arabia to liquidate
the AO's assets pending the termination of the organisation. Egypt
denounced these measures and responded in May 1979 by enacting
Decree Law No. 30 under which the AOI was "to continue to enjoy its
juristic personality" in accordance with the law of its seat, i.e. Egyptian
law. The Decree also provided:
The AOI shall continue to perform its activities, recover its rights and
discharge its obligations as a body corporate in Egypt and all other
States.
There was no doubt that Decree Law No. 30 and subsequent
Egyptian legislation purported to introduce changes to the constitution
and representation of the AOI as laid down in its constitutive treaty
instruments. For example, its High Committee now consisted exclusively
of Egyptians.
In 1980, Westland, considering that its joint-venture arrangements
had ended and having tried unsuccessfully to obtain compensation from
the "liquidation committee" in Saudi Arabia, commenced an ICC
arbitration in Geneva against, amongst others, the four member States
and the AO. 28 It asserted that the AOI against which it claimed was
not the entity in Egypt but the body with offices in Saudi Arabia.
Officers appointed pursuant to the 1979 Egyptian legislation sought to
represent the AOI as respondent. I 1988 the Swiss courts, on appeal
from the arbitral tribunal, held that the Egyptian body was not the entity
against which Westland claimed and so could not be a party to the
arbitration.129 Finally, in 1993, the arbitral tribunal awarded Westland
damages against the AOI of nearly £400 million together with interest.

130

Westland, which had already recovered some money by enforcement
proceedings taken in New York against AOI's deposits, thereupon
obtained from the English courts an order under the Arbitration Act 1975
to enforce in England the balance of the award in the same manner as a

128. See Westland Helicopters Ltd. et al., 80 I.L.R. 596 (1989).
129. AOI et al v. Westland Helicopters Ltd. et al., 80 I.L.R 622 (1989).
130. See 80 I.L.R at 390 (1989).
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judgment, and to do this by garnishee attachment of some £318 million
deposited at the six London banks in the name of the AOI. 131 Officers
appointed pursuant to the 1979 Egyptian legislation instructed lawyers to
intervene in the Commercial Court in London in the name of the AOI.
The AOI was said to be the true owner of the deposits, and once joined
as a party, to apply to set aside the above order on the ground that the
case fell within certain exceptions to enforcement laid down in the
Arbitration Act, in particular that AOI had been denied a proper
opportunity to present its case at the arbitration and that enforcement
would be against public policy. Westland sought to strike out the
application to intervene on the ground that those instructing the
intervenor did not have the authority of the AOI to do so and so had no
locus standi before the court. As Colman J. stated in the Commercial
Court:
... before this court can consider the attack on the enforcement of
that award, the Intervenor has to establish that it is the AOL, the party
to the shareholders' agreement, the respondent to the arbitration and the
judgment debtor. If it is not, it has no entitlement to intervene or to
seek to set13 2aside the order ... giving leave to enforce the award as a
judgment.

The intervenor argued that the existence, constitution and authority
of the officers of the AOI were to be determined by Egyptian law, this
133
being the law of AOI's headquarters and therefore of its domicile.
According to Egyptian law properly construed, there had been a
continuation of the legal personality of AOI and consequently a valid
appointment of those now seeking to act for it. Alternatively, if public
international law was the proper law of AOI, the intervenor could still
rely on the 1979 Egyptian legislation, since for Westland to argue that
this legislation violated public international law would be to raise nonjusticiable issues; even if such issues were justiciable, then the Egyptian
international law to
legislation was a lawful counter-measure in public
34
the actions of the other three member States.
Westland argued that the proper law for determining the existence,
constitution and representation of AOI was public international law and
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thus the Egyptian legislation was irrelevant. 35 For the intervenor to
argue that the Egyptian legislation was a justifiable response to a breach
of international law would raise a non-justiciable issue and therefore the
intervenor could not prove that it had authority to act for AOL.
Colman J. struck out the application to intervene. 3 6 Relying in
particular on Lord Wilberforce's observations in Buttes and Lord Oliver's
in Tn, he concluded "that it is not open to the English courts to
determine issues of public international law the result of which determination is likely to affect foreign sovereign States" and that "it is not open
to the English courts to determine whether a foreign sovereign state has
broken a treaty or effectively terminated it.' 37 He was entitled, however, to examine the terms of the AOI's constitutive treaty, since this had
been incorporated into the national legislation of Egypt in 1975, and
thence to determine what changes the 1979 Egyptian legislation might
have made to the treaty as incorporated. Colman . then examined the
judgment of Lord Templeman in AMF to see whether it was authority for
the proposition, advanced by the intervenor, that where, as here, the
international organisation had been given domestic legal personality in
the law of more than one State, it was the law of the headquarters State,
here Egypt, which had to be applied by an English court in determining
questions of its representation. In particular, it was argued by the
intervenor that Lord Templeman in stating that the UAE legislation had
"created" the AMF "a corporate body" meant that it was thereafter a
UAE corporation. Colman J. disagreed. He stated:
[Lord Templeman] was saying simply that, inasmuch as prior to the
decree the fund was an entity which did not exist as a juridical person
in UAE law, the decree had the effect of creating a juridical person in
the eye of UAE law.
Lord Templeman was... clearly saying that the law of the UAE had
created legal personality for the fund. He was not saying that the fund
was a UAE corporation with all the legal attributes of such a body any
more than the House of Lords in the Yin Council case was saying that
the ITC was or had all the attributes of a company incorporated under
38
the United Kingdom Companies Act.
Colman 3. considered that implicit in Lord Templeman's judgment
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was the premise that where an international organisation is given legal
personality in the laws of more than one foreign State, this did not
change the status of the organisation: it remained a single international
organisation and not a plurality of organisations. He went on:
In the case of an international organisation one looks to see whether it
has been accorded the legal capacity of a corporation under the law of
any of the member states or the state where it has its seat, if that state
is not a member state. Where some or all of the member states have
accorded to it the legal capacity of a corporation the English courts will
also treat it as having the legal capacity of a corporation. The fact that
several states have accorded to it that capacity under their law does not
mean that there is more than one international organisation for the
English courts to recognise, but merely that there is more than one
factual basis upon which recognition can be accorded to the same
organisation. '39
Having held that AMF did not compel him to apply the law of the
seat State, here Egypt, to questions of the constitution, existence and
representation of AOI, an issue which never had to be considered in
AMF, Colman J. then rejected the alternative argument that he should
apply Egyptian law by analogy with the English conflict of laws rule
whereby such questions in respect of a foreign corporation are governed
by the law of its seat or domicile. He held that an international organisation created by treaty was different from a foreign corporation in that the
proper law governing such questions in respect of an international
organisation was public international law and not the law of any of its
member States, even that of its seat State. He stated that "[i]t is thus
difficult to conceive of a course more obviously contrary to the comity
of nations than the imposition as the governing law by the English courts
of the domestic law of any one such member state, whether or not the
seat of the organisation." 14 This was underlined by Article 8 of the
1975 treaty itself under which the AOI was stated expressly not to be
subject to "the laws and systems in effect in the participating states".141
Colman J. had "no doubt whatever that the proper law governing the
existence, constitution and authority of its officers to represent the AOI
is public international law," and he did not find it a breach of the rule
relating to unincorporated treaties to have regard to the terms of the

139. Id. at 299.
140. Id. at 303-304.
141. Idat 304.
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treaty in order to identify the precise nature of the entity.142
Finally, Colman J. considered whether those claiming to represent
AOI could trace their authority from the constitutive treaty alone and
found that this was clearly not the case, since the basis for their authority
was the 1979 Egyptian legislation which broke the line of authority
flowing from the treaty. 43 The question whether or not the 1979
legislation was a justifiable counter-measure in public international law
was a non-justiciable issue in the English courts and was itself based on
the prior non-justiciable question whether or not the three member States
had broken the treaty as against Egypt.'"
As in IN, a financial settlement between the parties closely
followed Colman J.'s judgment, thus avoiding what would have been
almost inevitable appeals to the Court of Appeal and thence to the House
of Lords.
VII.

OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS.

An hitherto invisible international organisation, established by
agreement between States of which the United Kingdom may or may not
be one, is capable of being seen by the English courts and given the
capacity to function as a legal person in England if it has had conferred
on it at least one of the following:
1. legal personality by specific statutory provision (the Commonwealth
Secretariat by the Commonwealth Secretariat Act 1966);
2. legal personality by Order in Council pursuant to the International
Organisations Act 1968-81 (the ITC under the 1972 Order);
3. legal personality by the law of a sovereign State recognised by the
United Kingdom (the "domestic conflict of laws" route).
In 1, it is possible for the statute to require that the international
legal person should be an English, a Scottish, or a United Kingdom legal
person. In the unlikely case that the agreement establishing the organisation requires or permits this, in practice such a drastic step will not be
taken, since its effect would be to subject the organisation to national law
and would thereby amount to a "hijacking" by one of its members. In 2
and 3, the international organisation remains a single international legal
142. Id. at 308.
143. Id. at 311-12.
144. Id. at 310-11
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person irrespective of the terms of the foreign law. It is not regarded as
a foreign legal person and, if it has personality under the national laws
of more than one member State, it is not regarded as a number of foreign
legal persons. Nor is it regarded as an English legal person even though
it has personality in English law.
The years of expensive litigation in Thn ended with the conclusion
that the ITC had personality in English law as a consequence of the
words of the 1972 Order in Council. The ITC had also been accorded
personality in the national laws of at least one of its other twenty-two
member States, Australia, where regulations under Commonwealth
legislation had constituted it in 1982 "a body corporate with perpetual
succession". 45 Under the reasoning later used in AMF, this fact should
have rapidly settled the disputed issue in favour of the defendants, since
the ITC would have had personality in English law by the domestic
conflicts route. It is remarkable, however, that this route to English
personality was not taken by the defendants in their argument in Yin,
possibly because they assumed, rightly or wrongly, that United Kingdom
participation in the successive ITA agreements and the promulgation of
the ITC Order under the 1968/81 Act meant that the legal status of the
ITC in the United Kingdom had to be deduced from the Order alone.
It now remains to be seen whether there are any other routes by
which an international organisation may acquire legal personality before
English courts. Three possibilities come to mind: (A) a route whereby
personality in international law automatically becomes personality in
English law; (B) a route of executive recognition; (C) a residual
"common law" route.
A. Automatic Personality.
Here, it was argued by the plaintiff organisation in AMF at first
instance that the English conflict of laws recognises the existence of legal
entities constituted under international law just as it recognises those
constituted under foreign systems of domestic law." The ITC, the
AMF and the AOI were each stated in their respective constituent treaties
to have personality in international law. But in Yin, Lord Oliver on
several occasions referred to the ITC as a body which would not have
existed in English law if it had been merely an international legal person.

145. International Tin Council (Privileges and Immunities) Regulations S.R. 1982, No. 155
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Thus he described the ITC as a body "which, as an international legal
persona, had no status under the laws of the United Kingdom". 47 Later
in his judgment, he stated: "The ITC as a matter of English law owes its
existence to the Order in Council. That is what created the ITC in
domestic law... ,,148
Likewise, he later remarked: 'Without the Order
in Council the ITC had no legal existence in the law of the United
Kingdom and no significance save as the name of an international body
created by a treaty between sovereign states which was not justiciable by
municipal courts". 4 9 It was not surprising, therefore, that on delivery
of the House of Lords' decision in Tin the first line of argument of the
plaintiff in AMF was abandoned. In AMF in the House of Lords, Lord
Templeman stated that "[t]he Tin Council case reaffirmed that the
English courts cannot identify and allow actions by international
organisations
which sovereign states by treaty agree to bring into
50
existence".
B. Executive Recognition.
This differs from (A) in that the recognition of the executive is
required. At first instance in AMF, Hoffmann J., having stated that F.A.
Mann had considered that an international organisation, like a foreign
state, could be accorded legal capacity in the courts only if it was
recognised by the executive, 151 went on:
This qualification has not been universally accepted by other writers but
seems to me logical. The recognition of an international organisation
at the level of international law must be a matter for the Executive and
it would be rather odd if the English courts recognised the existence in
domestic law of an international organisation which Her Majesty's
Government declined to recognise in international law.'
But practice to support such a possibility is lacking. The British
Government's view set out in the Hollom-Judd correspondence of 1978
(which was concerned only with the situation of an organisation set up
by treaty to which the United Kingdom was not a member) envisaged not

147. Rayner supra note 87 at 506.
148. Id. at 507.
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a power to recognise any such international organisation but only one
which had been established in a foreign State recognised by the United
Kingdom and which enjoyed "legal personality and capacity in that
country", in other words, an entity complying with the domestic conflicts
rule. This restrictive aspect of the 1978 statement was stressed by Lord
Templeman in AMF.153
As Hoffmann I. concluded in his judgment in AMF at first instance,
the reasoning in In destroyed the organisation's first line of argument,
whether based on executive recognition or otherwise. Likewise, 71n is
equally incompatible with the existence of a doctrine that an organisation
established by a treaty to which the United Kingdom is a party, and thus
ex hypothesi recognised by the United Kingdom executive, thereby
acquires personality in English law. As a corollary, however, a positive
indication by the executive not to recognise an international organisation
should not compel the English courts to refuse it personality if it satisfies
the domestic conflicts test.
C. Residual "common law".
It might be argued that an international organisation is a collective
emanation of its member States and that as each of the member States
has legal personality in England, the organisation, too, must have
personality in English law. Attorney-General Somervell seems to have
thought along these lines before and at the time of the 1944 legislation
and to have considered that the common law would regard an international organisation as being a legal person separate from its members
rather than being merely a collective name for them. On the basis of this
argument, an international organisation for which there had been no
specific statute and no Order made under the 1968 Act would nevertheless have personality in English law.
Such a conclusion, however, is likewise inconsistent with the
judgments in TIn and AMF. AMF was concerned with only one aspect of
the personality of an international organisation in English law, although
its most important one, namely the capacity of the organisation to sue in more general terms, its locus standi in the courts. It can be deduced
from the decision in that case that under the domestic conflict of laws
rule the endowment of personality on an international organisation by the
law of one or more of its member States, or additionally its seat State

153. Id. at 163.
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where that State is not a member (e.g. Switzerland in respect of the
United Nations), entails as its minimum effect in English law the
consequence that the organisation may sue and be sued, and may have
rights in property. But does it also acquire immunities and privileges, and
if so which ones? Where the international organisation has been accorded
its English law personality by a specific statute or by an Order in
Council under the International Organisations Acts its immunities and
privileges are those expressly conferred by the statute or the Order
respectively. But where the organisation acquires its locus standi through
the domestic conflict of laws route, the position is unclear. If, as would
usually be the case, the member States, or at least the seat State, have
accorded it in their national laws the immunities and privileges provided
in the treaty, would an English court be obliged to hold that it had such
immunities and privileges in England? And what would be the position
if the various member States had accorded it different immunities and
privileges in their respective territories? The suggested answer is that
these domestic laws would have only local effect and could not confer
on an international organisation particular attributes, or a cumulation of
attributes, which English courts would be obliged to recognise under the
domestic conflict of laws rule. If this were not the case, the "trinitarian
subtlety" foreseen by Hoffmann 3. would arise whenever different foreign
States conferred different measures of immunities and privileges on the
same international organisation.
A residual question remains: do international organisations, with
locus standi in England under the domestic conflict of laws rule, have
immunities and privileges at common law? There is persuasive authority
for a negative answer. Writing in December 1981 before the ITC
litigation was foreseen, the Legal Advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, then Sir Ian Sinclair, expressed the official view as
follows:
The question whether an international organisation would enjoy
immunity from suit, if such immunity were not accorded by an
international agreement to which effect had been given in United
Kingdom law by a Statutory Instrument or other legislative provision,
has not been tested in the courts of the United Kingdom; but it is
thought likely that a court would hold that there were no international
customary rules on the subject and that the organisation would not
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therefore be accorded immunity.5
Likewise, in an early case arising out of the collapse of the
International Tin Council, Standard CharteredBank v. InternationalYIn
Council, Bingham L.J. remarked in an obiter dictum:
International organisations such as the ITC have never so far as I know
been recognised at common law as entitled to sovereign status. They
are accordingly entitled to no sovereign or diplomatic immunity in this
country save where such immunity is granted by legislative instrument,
and then only to the extent of such grant.'55
In the Court of Appeal judgments in in, Kerr L.J, with whom on
this point the other two judges agreed, held that the EEC did not have
immunity ratione personae at common law. As the EEC carries out
functions which are much closer to those of a sovereign State than the
functions of most other international organisations, one might fairly
deduce that Kerr L.J. would have had no sympathy for a claim to a
common law immunity by other organisations.
Despite the clarification brought to the law by the above three cases
there is still the possibility that further questions will face the English
courts. Two come immediately to mind: (i) following the domestic
conflicts route, two - or even more - bodies, each claiming to be the
persona of the one international organisation oppose each other in the
English courts, (ii) rival groups, each claiming to be the authentic
representative of the international organisation, oppose each other in the
English courts, thus raising a problem which did not exist in AOI where
only the Egyptian officials sought to intervene and not those in other
member States. The question is to what extent may the English courts
examine the constitutive instrument of the organisation - usually a treaty
- to determine such disputes. If the terms of the treaty are so clear that
a perfunctory glance will reveal that one of the claimants is an impostor,
then it seems just that the English courts should examine the treaty and
determine this. But would even a perfunctory glance amount to a nonjusticiable "interpretation" of the treaty? Or could it be justified, as
Colman J. indicated in AOI, as a necessary step in the interpretation of
the foreign law on which the claimant relies? A practitioner experienced
in these matters wrote after the House of Lords' decisions in in and

154. Quoted in Geoffrey Marston (ed.), United Kingdom Materials on InternationalLaw, 52
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AMF, but before AOl:
But the total exclusion of international law in the manner now
suggested by these two House of Lords decisions
is misplaced, and
56
damaging to the development of English law.
In Colman J.'s opinion, treaties may be perused, either "as a matter
of fact" or "as a matter of the municipal law" of the incorporating State,
provided that such perusal does not breach the "ring-fence" protecting
issues of international law from being determined by English judges.
Whether a breach would be so caused may be a difficult question for a
judge in a particular case.
VIII.

CONCLUSION.

The brief discussion above indicates that although the broad outline
of the status of international organisations in English law has been
defined by the cases mentioned above, there still remain some obscure
areas within the frame. Furthermore, an international organisation which
is not the subject of legislation in the United Kingdom and which has not

been accorded personality in the laws of any of its member States is still
invisible to the eyes of English courts. The arrival on the litigation scene
in the early nineteenth century of States and governments separate from
human monarchs caused English courts to doubt whether they could be
legal persons." 7 Before long, the courts had side-stepped the doubt by

156. Jeremy Carver, InternationalOrganisationsAfterArab MonetaryFund,2 BUTTERWORTH's
J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 215, 218 (1987).
157. In Edwards and Thomas v. The Government of Colombia, the sum of £378,000, said to
be the property of the Government of Colombia, then unrecognised by the British Government, and
lying in the hands of Goldschmidt & Co. in London, was sought to be attached by one Thomas
Edwards who claimed that the Government of Colombia was indebted in this sum to him and his
assignee, Samuel Thomas, on bills of exchange. In the Mayor's Court in the City of London, it was
argued by the garnishees, Goldschmidts', that not only should the attachment be set aside but the
action of debt itself, directed as it was against the Government of the Republic of Colombia, should
be set aside "as one wholly incapable of being maintained upon any principle of common law or
common sense - a thing, in fact, amounting to a complete nullity". Counsel believed that it was "the
first time that ever the Government of any country was made party to a suit of any kind; and it was
still more extraordinary that a Government should be made a party to a personal action of debt". He
went on to say:
In the case of a corporation, which might be considered
somewhat analogous, the attorney for that corporation must be sued,
and not the body itself. But, to sue a Government for money,
struck him as one of the most palpable absurdities by which a
commercial people could be deceived. What did government mean
but the effect produced by the operation of the functions of the
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adopting the doctrine of conclusive executive recognition." It seems
that in the United Kingdom of the late twentieth century the legislature
and the courts are not yet prepared to make this particular solution
applicable to international organisations.

governors towards the governed?
Counsel went on to state that "to sue a Government for money, struck him as one of the most
palpable absurdities by which a commercial people could be deceived". The Recorder stated: "It
was, indeed, a most extraordinary sort of proceeding to sue a Government. The plaintiff might as
well sue a whole nation." He set all the proceedings aside. See Attachment Upon the Property of
the Colombian Government, THE TIMES, Sept. 15, 1824, at 3.
158. E.g., The Colombian Government v. Rothschild, 57 Eng. Rep. 514 (1826). By this time
the British Government had recognised the Government of Colombia in April 1825 as the
government of a independent sovereign State. Even so, the court held that the foreign State had to
sue in the names of public officers entitled to represent the State.

